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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to investigate the inner mechanics of policy change.  It aims to 
discover how ideas enter the political arena, and how endogenous forces within 
the policy making environment transform ideas into new policies.  The central 
hypothesis is that in times of crisis, new ideas emanate from a number of change 
agents, but in order for any of these ideas to enter the institutional environment, 
one specific agent of change must be present: the political entrepreneur.  Without 
political entrepreneurs ideational change, and subsequent policy change, would 
not occur.  The paper sets out a framework for identifying and explaining the 
endogenous drivers of policy change, and then tests this framework on two case 
studies, from two countries.     
 
Crises and policy change: the role of the political entrepreneur 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
‘How can we explain periods of relative stability, even inertia, which are then 
succeeded by often dramatic policy change?’ (Meijerink 2005, 1060).  This is a 
problem that has vexed political scientists.  Path dependence views 
institutions/policies as fixtures in social networks, providing stability (Clemens 
and Cook 1999), and while this provides a level of understanding as to how 
institutions/policies evolve, explaining change in this context has often relied 
upon exogenous shocks.  However, Howlett (2009, 245) argues, ‘the idea that 
change occurs largely through exogenous shocks flies in the face of much 
evidence about the effects of policy learning or other endogenous sources of 
fundamental change.’ 
When Sir Ralph Harris, head of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), 
suggested to Margaret Thatcher that the IEA had been advocating market reform 
and monetarism two decades prior to her election as Prime Minister, Thatcher 
quipped: ‘Ralph, the cock may crow but it’s the hen that lays the egg.’1  This 
captures our paper’s hypothesis that, in the context of an exogenous shock, in this 
case a crisis in the British economy in 1979, the political entrepreneur is the main 
agent of policy change.  The political entrepreneur acts as a bridge between those 
developing/advocating new policy ideas – policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1995), 
policy networks (Pemberton 2000) or other change agents (Hall 1993) – and the 
institutions implementing them.  In the network of actors contributing to policy 
change, the political entrepreneur sits at the centre of the process.  Without a 
political entrepreneur to inject the new ideas of policy entrepreneurs into the 
political arena at times of crisis, such as recessions, wars, or political instability, 
policy change will not occur (Hogan and Feeney, 2012). 
Although the concepts of political and policy entrepreneurship have 
received attention in the literature, ‘the concept of policy entrepreneurship is yet 
to be broadly integrated within studies of policy change’ (Mintrom and Norman 
2009, 649-650).  To address this lacuna, our paper examines case studies from 
two countries experiencing economic crises during the mid 1970s and early 
1980s.  Such historical cross-national studies hold considerable promise for 
achieving a conceptual breakthrough in our understanding of policy change 
(Mintrom and Norman 2009, 662). 
 This paper initially discusses the institutional and policy change literature, 
then examines the various types of change agents, before setting out the 
hypotheses for identifying policy change and testing these against the selected 
cases.  The conclusion highlights the paper’s significance and limitations 
 
                                                 
1 Financial Times, 20 October, 2006, p.15. 
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Section 1: Institutional Analysis and Explanations of Change 
 
The issue of policy change has often been addressed in political science literature 
by the concept of exogenous shocks.  Crises are regularly blamed for destabilising 
polices.  For instance, Greener (2001, 134) argues exogenous shocks result in new 
policy paradigms.  Consequently, the policy change literature (Collier and Collier 
1991; Mahoney 2001; Hogan, 205; Hogan and Doyle, 2009; Hogan and 
Cavatorta, 2013) has sought to perfect our identification of crises and critical 
junctures.  But, the literature has not paid sufficient attention to the mechanics 
through which crises result in policy change. 
The critical junctures concept was co-opted by path dependence scholars 
as a means of accounting for change.  This is akin to the use of punctuated 
equilibrium in neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory (Gould and Eldredge 1977).  
Consequently, a regularly invoked interpretation of policy change has divided 
history into ‘normal periods’ and ‘critical junctures,’ during which major change 
is possible (Gorges 2001, 156).  The concepts of critical junctures and exogenous 
shocks have sometimes been reduced to a deus ex machina to explain change that 
has proved otherwise inexplicable.  Thus, exogenous explanations for sudden and 
dramatic shifts in policies tend to be crude.  Orren and Skowronek (1994, 20) 
observe that punctuated equilibrium models ignore many of the characteristics of 
change and endogenous characteristics of change specifically.  Thus, the problem 
here seems to be the use of exogenous shocks in a deterministic fashion that 
ignores endogenous entities - constituents such as policy and political 
entrepreneurs - who respectively generate and institutionalise emergent policy 
ideas.  However, without the notion of exogenous shocks to initiate the change 
process, path dependence is reduced to an equilibrium model.  Yet, at a time of 
crisis, if we can look within an institution for sources of policy change, in terms of 
idea generation and idea advocacy, we can avoid the necessity of having to rely 
exclusively upon exogenous explanations for policy change.   
Crises expose decision makers to criticism and demands for more effective 
action (Walsh 2006, 492), resulting in policy change.  Yet, sometimes crises do 
not result in policy changes.  What accounts for this ambiguity?  Walsh (2006) 
argues that policy change is most likely to occur when an alternative policy idea 
can explain past failures and secure the support of powerful constituents.  It is to 
these powerful constituents, capable of generating and advocating alternative 
policy ideas, that we now turn.   
 
Section 2: Agents of Change 
The term political entrepreneur, as an explicit concept, was developed by Dahl 
(1961) (McCaffrey and Salerno 2011, 552).  Dahl (1961, 6) contended that the 
political entrepreneur is the crucial agent of change, and ‘is not so much the agent 
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of others as others are his agents.’  The political entrepreneur picks and chooses 
from policy ideas put forward by policy entrepreneurs at times of crisis and 
shapes the terms of political debate by influencing agendas and constructing 
cultural frames (Hwang and Powell 2005, 191).  They ‘exploit moments of 
instability’ created by exogenous shocks and ‘invest resources in the creation of a 
new policy, or new forms of collective action', having ‘transformative effects on 
politics, policies, and institutions’ (Sheingate 2003, 188-190). 
 Kingdon (1995) suggests change agents encompass a broad grouping of 
what he terms ‘policy entrepreneurs.’  When a policy is in difficulty, due to an 
exogenous shock for instance, windows of opportunity appear in which policy 
entrepreneurs challenge the existing paradigm (Kingdon 1995).  They present a 
range of new ideas to replace the ones upon which existing policy is based and in 
the process vie for the attention of politicians to get their ideas into the policy-
making environment.  Policy entrepreneurs encompass civil servants, technocrats, 
academics, economists and interest groups etc., who engage in policy innovation, 
and have some access to decision makers. 
Pemberton (2000, 777) identifies change agents as belonging to a policy 
network schema.  In this case the policy entrepreneurs are essential for advocating 
new policy ideas to replace failing arrangements at times of crisis.  However, the 
role of the political entrepreneur, willing to become an idea’s “champion,” is 
crucial.  The result is the creation of coalitions among a variety of policy 
entrepreneurs and the political entrepreneur, whereby, ‘ideas facilitate the 
reduction of … barriers by acting as coalition-building resources’ (Blyth 2002, 
37).  Political entrepreneurs are the bridge between those advocating new policy 
ideas (policy entrepreneurs) and the institutions implementing them.  As such, 
political entrepreneurs, by influencing agendas, shape the terms of political debate 
(Hwang & Powell 2005, p. 212).  ‘Successful political entrepreneurs are able to 
consolidate innovations, producing political or social change that has enduring 
effects in the form of new programs, policies, or organizations’ (Hwang & Powell 
2005, p. 214).  This recognises leadership as a situational phenomenon, whereby 
leaders can take institutions/policies in particular directions (Wallis and Dollery 
1997, 1-7).  This paper contends that at times of exogenous shocks policy 
entrepreneurs and outside influences are responsible for producing new ideas, but 
the political entrepreneur acts as a figurehead, introducing these ideas into the 
policy process.  The political entrepreneur, at the head of an entrepreneurial 
network of policy entrepreneurs, is capable of engaging in the process of creative 
destruction in relation to policy.    
 The relationship between policy and political entrepreneurs can be 
illustrated by the astronomical concept of a nebula, wherein the gravitational 
mechanics result in the clustering of particles to produce mass and eventually 
stars.  Like such particles, there are always policy entrepreneurs with policy ideas, 
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swirling around in the policy making environment.  In the wake of a crisis policy 
entrepreneurs vie for the attention of politicians to get their ideas into the policy-
making arena.  If a politician is willing to act as a political entrepreneur and 
champion a new idea they can draw policy entrepreneurs and other interests to 
them, building a mass of support behind the policy idea they are advocating 
(Figure 1).  There are advantages for each side in the relationship.  The political 
entrepreneur benefits from the expertise of policy entrepreneurs, to say nothing of 
their support, while the latter benefit from the politician’s “patronage” of their 
idea in the corridors of power.  The more senior the political entrepreneur, and the 
more determined they are in advancing a particular policy the greater their 
entrepreneurial potential (Wallis and Dollery 1997: 3).  Thus, the process of 
change is located in the interaction of ideas, actors and institutions (Hay 2004). 
 
Figure 1: The Policy Change Nebula 
  Political Entrepreneur 
 Political Elite 
 Policy Entrepreneur  
 
Section 3: Framework for the Identification of Policy Change 
 
Existing explanations of policy change, while acknowledging the role of policy 
entrepreneurs, fail to integrate the separate concepts of policy and political 
entrepreneurship into their transformative frameworks (Mintrom and Norman 
2009).  This paper seeks to develop an understanding of the endogenous forces 
driving policy change, wherein the political entrepreneur, interacting with policy 
entrepreneurs, plays a crucial role.  Building on the work discussed above, the 
paper hypothesizes that policy change occurs in three stages: initiation of the 
policy debate due to a crisis, ideational change, and the advent of the political 
Third Order 
Policy 
Change 
Third Order 
Policy 
Change 
Political entrepreneurs 
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entrepreneur.  The paper seeks to help explain why, in the wake of certain crises 
and policy failures, there is policy change, while at other times of crisis no change 
occurs.  
We will measure the nature of policy change using the concepts of first-, 
second- and third-order change developed by Hall (1993). Hall (1993, 291) argues 
that exogenous shocks and policy failures can set off processes that lead to 
ideational change to the extent of resulting in the re-examination of the belief 
systems through which extant policy has been generated.  Thus, this approach 
provides us with a useful tool for understanding degrees of policy change.  In 
Hall’s (1993, 278) view, first order change, that is change to policy instrument 
settings, is a response to policy feedback.  Whilst politicians are present in the 
core decision-making network, it is policy entrepreneurs who dominate this 
process.  Second order change, that is change to the instruments of policy and 
their settings, is also driven by policy entrepreneurs, not politicians.  In instances 
of both first and second order change the overall goals of policy remain the 
unaltered.  However, in relation to third order change there is change in the 
instrument settings, the instruments themselves and the hierarchy of goals behind 
policy (Hall 1993, 278-279).  In this case it is politicians, and not policy 
entrepreneurs, who dominate the process.  ‘Such wholesale changes in policy 
occur relatively rarely’ (Hall 1993, 279). 
 
The Initiation of the Policy Debate 
 
Crises or exogenous shocks are often cited as explanations for policy change 
(Greener 2001; Golob 2003, 373) as their existence highlights a failing within 
existing policies due to their implication in, or inability to right, the emergent 
situation (Levy 1994).  In order for policy entrepreneurs to challenge existing 
arrangements, a crisis and policy failure must be identified, and widely perceived 
(Hay 1999, 324).  Agents must diagnose, and impose on others, their notion of a 
crisis before collective action to resolve the resultant uncertainty can be taken 
(Blyth 2002, 9).  By shaping ‘the terms of political debate: they frame issues, 
define problems and influence agendas’ (Sheingate 2003, 188).  They ultimately 
initiate a debate concerning extant ideational orthodoxy. 
In terms of macroeconomic shocks, Garrett (1993, 522) suggests ‘most 
scholars agree that severe recessions make significant structural changes possible 
because they render politics highly fluid’.  A crisis can call into question existing 
policies, bringing about the possibility of change (Tilly 1975).  Accordingly: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A crisis/exogenous shock will initiate debate concerning existing 
policy arrangements. 
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Ideational Change  
 
Once a crisis is identified the failure of a prevailing policy paradigm drives 
policymakers to look outside government for a solution (Oliver and Pemberton 
2004, 419).  Ideas influence policy by acting though particular actors who 
promote an idea and build a supporting coalition (Berman 1998, 14-22).  As 
policy entrepreneurs are team players they can constitute an ‘entrepreneurial 
network’, the composition and size of which can demonstrate the support for an 
idea (Mintrom and Norman 2009, 653).  The triumph of a new idea from policy 
entrepreneurs depends upon ‘a workable new idea being available’ which a 
political entrepreneur is then prepared to promote (Oliver and Pemberton 2004, 
419).  Such ideas determine the path of subsequent policy, as policymakers work 
within a framework of ideas and standards that specify not only the goals of 
policy, but the instruments to be used to achieve these goals, and the nature of the 
problems they are meant to address (Hall 1993, 279). 
Policy entrepreneurs function as a link between problems and the policies 
introduced by political entrepreneurs to resolve those problems.  Political 
entrepreneurs’ co-ordinate the policy entrepreneurs, encouraging them to coalesce 
around a decipherable set of alternative ideas, they are the link between the 
innovation of the policy entrepreneurs and policy change.  Thus, the political 
entrepreneurs are the drivers of creative destruction.  
According to Legro (2000) extant ideational collapse and new ideational 
consolidation are components of the ideational change process.  Should a range of 
policy entrepreneurs agree that the prevailing paradigm is inadequate ideational 
collapse will occur (Legro 2000, 419).  In the wake of ideational collapse, the 
issue is reaching consensus on a new set of ideas.  Legro (2000) argues that if 
consensus is achieved we will then see change agents co-ordinating a replacement 
set of ideas to the reigning consensus.  However, ‘failure to reach consensus on a 
replacement could still produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the 
old orthodoxy’ (Legro 2000, 424).  Walsh (2006, 494) sees this as the 
continuation of failed policies due to a lack of coherent intellectual links between 
policy tools and desired outcomes.  In the wake of ideational collapse, a new idea 
will be adopted if an identifiable political entrepreneur is present to champion it, 
and the idea itself is politically intelligible – as Thatcher suggested: the cock may 
crow, but there must be a hen to lay the egg.  Consequently: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Policy failures will lead to underlying ideational collapse as policy 
entrepreneurs (entrepreneurial networks) critique the current model and generate 
replacement ideas, which they will consolidate around if a political entrepreneur 
is present, resulting in ideational change. 
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Without a political entrepreneur acting as a type of ideational 
figurehead/catalyst, this new idea will not enter the institutional environment. 
 
Policy Change 
 
Hall (1993, 291) argued that exogenous shocks, and policy failures, discredit the 
old paradigm, leading a re-examination of the belief systems through which that 
policy was created.  We pointed out above how he describes rare, but radical, and 
overarching changes in policy as third order changes.  As we argue that political 
entrepreneurs are necessary for such paradigm shifts to occur, we are effectively 
using third order change as the threshold for evaluating the presence of political 
entrepreneurs.  This is because political entrepreneurs exploit the uncertainty 
created by crises (what Blyth (2002) terms as Knightian uncertainty), and ‘search 
for that mix of interests and appeals that can produce a winning coalition’ to 
generate major change (Sheingate 2003, 192).  For new ideas to overthrow extant 
policies the political entrepreneur must occupy a position enabling them challenge 
existing arrangements.  Political entrepreneurs can be leaders of the governing 
party, or an opposition party, though Oliver (1997, 144-145) suggests that for a 
political party a period in opposition can be conductive to social learning, 
allowing it be more open to new ideas.  For an idea to triumph political 
entrepreneurs act as ideational coordinators, bringing a broad array of policy 
entrepreneurs in the entrepreneurial network together in a coalition for ideational 
and policy change.  Without a political entrepreneur to inject new ideas into the 
policy making arena, third order/paradigm change (Hall 1993) will not occur, as 
no agents within the entrepreneurial network possesses the necessary access to 
existing institutional arrangements to implement such change.  Instead, there may 
be a first order policy change (change to the policy instrument settings), or a 
second order policy change (change to the setting and instruments of policy).   
Consequently: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Third order (paradigmatic) policy change will result if a political 
entrepreneur injects the ideas espoused by an entrepreneurial network into the 
political environment. 
 
While policy networks constitute a particularly important intermediate variable in 
enabling policy change (Pemberton 2000), the political entrepreneur is the 
“crucial element”. 
 
Section 4: Methods and Country Selection  
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Comparative historical analysis has sought to provide temporally grounded 
accounts of diverse topics in the social sciences including policy change.  This 
approach is ‘defined by a concern with the use of systematic and contextualized 
comparison’ (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003, 3).  By examining the nature of 
economic policy change at the national level in two countries, namely Sweden 
and the United State (US), this paper seeks to add to the extant literature made up 
of mostly individual country examinations that often juxtapose different levels of 
policy change (Howlett & Cashore 2009). 
 Sweden in the mid 1970s and the US at the beginning of the 1980s 
constitute interesting cases.  Each country appeared to have reached a turning 
point in their histories at these times.  In Sweden, the years immediately following 
the oil crisis of the early 1970s were marked by both recession and stagflation, as 
the economy struggled to maintain the welfare state (OECD 1978).  In a context 
of declining economic competiveness, rising unemployment and a widening 
budget deficit there were worries that the Swedish Model of free enterprise 
coexisting with an expansive welfare state could no longer survive (Fulcher 1991, 
267; Mjoset 1992, 347).  By the early 1980s, the US was locked in economic 
stagnation (Dark 2001, 114).  Stagflation led to a deep soul searching as to the 
country’s economic future (Divine et al. 1995, 569).  There was a sense that the 
federal government lacked an understanding of how this problem might be 
resolved (Spulber 1995, 41).   
 In both countries there was deep anxiety – a questioning of past decisions 
married with uncertainty as to how to proceed.  In a sense, they were experiencing 
existential angst.  To many Swedes the Swedish Model appeared unsustainable by 
the mid 1970s, while for Americans the central tenets of the American Dream 
seemed to have foundered.   
In addition to having reached a crossroads in their development, the 
countries were selected using a combination of most-similar and most different 
criteria, where similar and different independent variables are focused upon.  
Using the most similar case selection method, the same independent variables are 
chosen, while employing the most different technique dissimilar independent 
variables are selected (Gerring 2007).  The US and Sweden share the overarching 
criteria of being long-standing democracies and capitalist states.  The specific 
criteria were stable democracy since the first half of the twentieth century, and 
founding membership of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), conditions uniting the principles of representative 
democracy and the free market.  Thus, we are examining the nature of 
macroeconomic policy change, within the context of different temporal 
boundaries (Gerring 2007, 20), at the national level.  These countries are most 
different according to Lijphart’s (1999) categories of majoritarian and consensual 
democracies, allowing us to control for varying institutional arrangements.  
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Additionally, while the US is a federal presidential republic, Sweden is a 
constitutional monarchy.  Both countries’ economies’ performances, and the 
policies governing them, varied during the 20th century.   
The case studies’ similarities ensure “the contexts of analysis are 
analytically equivalent,” while their differences place “parallel processes of 
change in sharp relief” (Collier 1997, 4).  The value of such cross national studies, 
historical in context, is that they offer the prospect of conceptual breakthroughs in 
our understanding of policy change (Lieberman 2001). 
 
Section 5: Evaluation and Discussion 
 
Sweden – 1976 
 
The Economic Crisis 
 
By the 1970s Sweden was straining under the burden of supporting its welfare 
state (Time 1976a, 9).  Increased international competition, stagnating demand, 
and recession following the oil crisis of 1973, led to decline in the steel and 
shipbuilding industries (Lundberg 1982, 199).  The industrial sector shrank 
relative to other parts of the economy.  Annual productivity growth, having 
increased at 4.1 percent per year between 1950 and 1973, dropped to 1.4 percent 
thereafter (Forseback 1976, 29).  The public sector’s share of GDP rose and the 
number of public sector jobs, increased to maintain the image of full employment, 
came to outnumber those in private industry after 1978 (Gress 1991; OECD 1992, 
62).  Lindbeck (1997, 1312) argues that sluggish productivity growth was, to 
some extent, the result of the increasing size of public sector.   
By 1976, most economic indicators were pointing downwards.  Sweden’s 
unemployment rate averaged 2 percent during the 1970s, double that experienced 
in the 1960s (OECD 1977, 5).  ‘But the maintenance of high employment had 
been accompanied by less favourable performance in other areas, notably costs, 
prices and the balance of payments’ (OECD 1977, 42).  Inflation was double that 
of the previous decade, with the oil crisis contributing to prices’ upward 
trajectory.  ‘In the 1970s, wages exploded in a self-destructive series of 
agreements that placed Swedish firms in the un-competitive position of having the 
highest paid labour force in the world’ (Ahlén 1989, 333).  The balance of 
payments also deteriorated sharply (OECD 1976, 19).  The economy’s growth 
slowed to 1 percent in 1976, from 2.5 percent the previous year, before 
contracting in 1977 (O’Connor, O’Malley and Foley 1978).  The government’s 
purist of counter-cyclical fiscal policies resulted in the budget deficit expanding 
significantly (Siven 1984), with the national debt tripling within a decade (OECD 
1982, 16).   
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Extant Ideational Collapse  
 
During the 1970s, elections were dominated by concerns over social welfare, 
employment, taxation ad nuclear power.  As the 1976 general election 
approached, the Social Democratic Workers’ Party, Socialdemokratiska 
Arbetarepartiet (SAP) noted declining support (Hadenius 1997, 121).  The 
previous three years had been marked by parliamentary deadlock – due to a close 
1973 election.  In 1976 the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, 
Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO), proposed a wage earner fund, through a levy 
on corporate profits, to transfer control of enterprises with more than 50 
employees to the unions (Esping-Andersen 1992, 59).  But, the SAP retreated 
from the idea due to the opposition of the Swedish Employers’ Federation, 
Svenska Arbetsgivarforening (SAF) (Whyman and Burkitt 1993, 612).  The non-
socialist parties, ‘at last with an issue around which they could collectively 
mobilise’, argued that the wage earner fund proposal demonstrated the SAP 
wanted state dominance in the business sector, whereas the Swedish model had 
been built on co-operation of both sides of industry with a neutral state (Blyth 
2002, 207).  The unions seemed to be moving further to the left, away from an 
accommodation with capitalism and towards outright socialism, while their 
political allies in the SAP were shifting to towards the centre.  The SAP was also 
criticised from the left by the Left Party Communists, Vänsterpartiet 
Kommunisterna (VPK), due to unprecedented unrest in the labour market.  This 
situation, rife with unfulfilled economic expectations, and change agents 
dissatisfied with the prevailing circumstances and paradigm, constituted ideational 
collapse. 
 
The Failure of New Ideational Consolidation 
 
The deadlock in Parliament between the 1973 and 1976 elections created political 
uncertainty, while the three non-socialist parties (Centre, Liberal, and Moderate) 
became more skilled at presenting a united front in election campaigns and 
Parliament (Time 1976b, 32).  The 1976 election campaign saw the non-socialist 
parties unite under the leadership of Thorbjörn Fälldin of the Centre Party (Back 
et al. 2009).  Fälldin depicted the SAP government as advocates of an unwieldy, 
inhuman society that accorded higher priority to growth and profitability than to 
other, more important values, such as the environment and individual freedom.  
Time (1976b, 32) pointed out that the growing concentration of state power and 
fear of the over bureaucratisation of society through the wage earner funds, were 
the non-socialists’ targets.  This election, resulting in only small shifts in the 
relative strength of the socialist and non-socialist blocs, saw the defeat of the SAP 
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after having ruled Sweden for 44 years.2  The combination of the Centre, Liberal, 
and Moderate parties won a five seat majority in parliament.  ‘The Swedish model 
has gone in for repair,’ proclaimed the Financial Times.3   
 The discussions surrounding the election and economy did not result in the 
emergence of alternative economic ideas to the existing ones, or a significant 
change agent – a political entrepreneur.  The SAF acted as a policy entrepreneur 
to the extent that it sought to stop wage earner funds, but that was all.  No other 
significant policy entrepreneurs were present.  No political leader was prepared to 
advocate an alternative to, or an end to, social democracy.  The non-socialists had 
been out of power for almost half a century, so the last thing they wanted was 
dismantle the welfare state built up by the LO and SAP, for fear of another half 
century in opposition.  Thus, in spite of the dominant economic orthodoxy’s 
failure to meet the challenges of the post oil crises world, the non-socialist parties 
proved both unwilling and unable to create a coalition around alternative ideas to 
social democracy.  They wanted to show the public that the welfare state was safe 
with them. 
 
 
First Order Policy Change  
 
The SAP’s election defeat only resulted in what could best be described as 
“business as usual” for the welfare state.  The new Prime Minister Thorbjörn 
Fälldin, in order to form a coalition out of the non-socialist parties, backed away 
from anything that might generate controversy.4  For instance, his re-election 
promise to rapidly dismantle nuclear power plants was shelved5, as both the 
Liberals and Moderates supported the construction of more such facilities (Time 
1976a, 9).  Such constraints on the ability to implement election promises had 
severe consequences for the government’s lifespan.  Ironically, there followed, 
under the non-socialists, an expansion in spending to reanimate the sluggish 
economy, as well as increases in sick pay, funding for child-care centres and food 
subsidies. 
Nevertheless, the employers, encouraged by the SAP's defeat, launched an 
ideological and political counter-offensive against the trade union movement 
(Whyman and Burkitt 1993, 606).  In contrast to the 1930s, the balance of power 
gradually shifted in the SAF’s favour.  However, no change to social democracy 
nature of the state occurred after 1976.  ‘When the non-socialists came to power 
they said they would run the social democracy better than the Social Democrats 
                                                 
2 The Guardian, 20 September, 1976, p. 1. 
3 Financial Times, 7 October, 1976, p. 12. 
4 The Wall Street Journal, 21 September 1976, p. 21. 
5 The New York Times, 24 October, 1976, p. 3. 
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had,’ observed Sten Westerberg.6  Fälldin assured Swedes that he had no intention 
of repealing any of their social benefits, and instead promised to try and better 
them (Hadenius 1997).  The new government continued to consult regularly with 
the union movement and the LO's representation on government committees and 
commissions was the same after 1976 as before.  But, Fälldin did interpret the 
election as a mandate to break the concentration of power in the state's 
bureaucracy and to halt experimentation with new social programmes.   
The new administration, eager to prove it would not wreck the welfare 
state, took measures to ease the structural problems industry faced.  Certain firms 
in difficulty were nationalised while others received subsidies (O’Connor, 
O’Malley and Foley 1978, 3).  The support of employment in iron ore, steel, and 
shipbuilding meant preservation of inappropriate structures of production.  
Unemployment also continued to be concealed by expanding public works, 
training programmes, and the public sector (Statistisk Arsbok 1982-83). ‘The 
results were predictable, the budget and external current account went deep into 
deficit, and inflation rose’ (Delsen and van Veen 1992, 94). 
 After two years trying to find a solution to Sweden’s nuclear power issues 
the Fälldin government resigned.  It was replaced by a Liberal minority 
government, with Ola Ullsten as prime minister.  This government lasted for just 
under a year.  The 1979 general election saw the non-socialist parties take 49 
percent of the vote and win the election by just one seat.  Thorbjorn Fälldin 
returned as prime minister.  However, on many issues the non-socialists remained 
divided (Peterson 1987, 33).  Consequently, the coalition could not agree on a set 
of policies to counteract the deteriorating economic situation (Olsen 1984).  Not 
only were they unable to make significant reductions in public expenditure, but 
their rule coincided with a particularly difficult time for the economy.  The irony 
was that the right wing administrations had nationalised and subsidised weak 
industries, something the SAP had resisted (OECD 1978, 21).  This failure to 
improve the economy led to disenchantment amongst the electorate.  All the non-
socialist governments seemed to want was to maintain social democracy by 
whatever means necessary (Callaghan 2000, 125).   
 In this case, economic policy instrument settings changed (first order 
policy change), but the instruments of economic policy, and the goals behind it, 
remained much the same (Hall 1993). 
 
Table 2: Empirical Theoretical Fit for Sweden 1980s 
 Sweden 1980s 
Hypothesis 1 – crisis to initiate debate concerning extant policy Yes 
Hypothesis 2 – ideational change (extant ideational collapse and No 
                                                 
6 Financial Times, 13 November, 1991, p. 2. 
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new ideational consolidation) 
Hypothesis 3 – third order policy change  No 
 
The economic crisis in Sweden failed to generate a significant level of 
debate on alternatives to social democracy.  While extant economic policy was 
perceived as failing, change agents did not consolidate around a replacement 
orthodoxy.  This was primarily due to the absence of policy entrepreneurs putting 
forward alternative ideas to social democracy and a political entrepreneur willing 
to champion alternative ideas in the policy making environment (Figure 2).  
Despite an economic crisis, criticisms of social democratic policies and their 
underlying theories, and a change of government from SAP to a liberal coalition, 
this orthodoxy endured.  No political party leader, nor party, was willing to take 
on this pillar of Swedish society for fear of electoral suicide.  ‘Apart from 
disavowing wage earner funds, the bourgeois parties offered no real alternative to 
SAP policies’ (Blyth 2002, 207).  Ironically, the non-socialist coalitions went 
further than the SAP in supporting industries in difficulty and ultimately failed to 
adjust the expectations of the electorate to Sweden's straitened circumstances.7 
 
Figure 2: The absence of political entrepreneurs in Sweden 1976 
 
 Political Entrepreneur 
 Political Elite 
 Policy Entrepreneur  
 
The United State of America – 1980/1981 
 
The Economic Crisis 
                                                 
7 The Financial Times, 29 September, 1982, p. 16. 
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The last year of President Carter's administration was marked by rising 
unemployment and high interest rates (OECD 1982).  ‘Washingtonians joked that 
[Carter] was the first President with poll ratings lower than the prime interest rate’ 
(Boller 1996, 355).  The president's implementation of the Credit Control Act had 
the effect of reducing borrowing, and putting a dampener on economic growth 
(Hall 2003, 172).  By 1980 inflation reached 13.5 percent, its highest level since 
1946, while GDP growth contracted (Mitchell 1998).  The nonpartisan National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), with a reputation for declaring when 
recessions start and finish, announced that the US economy was in recession 
(Time 1980a, 48).  The Economic Report of the President 1981 showed an 
administration ready to ‘throw in the towel’ on the economy (Spulber 1995, 41).  
There was criticism of Carter’s plans to stimulate the economy (Biven 2002, 27).  
‘Too little, too late, too political,’ complained Murray Weidenbaum of 
Washington University, providing ‘the opposite of what the ailing economy 
needs’ (Time 1980b, 34).  Teaster (2004, 45) points out that by late autumn 
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker acknowledged that the economy was in 
recession.  The problem was that the Fed, in tightly controlling the money supply, 
caused interest rates to reach their highest levels in a century.  The effect was to 
reduce borrowing and send spending into decline (Weidenbaum 2011, 98)).  Thus, 
the combined actions of the Federal reserve and the White House plunged the 
economy into the recession that they had both been trying to avoid (Dark 2001, 
120).  Volcker's advocacy of a tightened money supply in order to reduce inflation 
constituted a move towards monetarist policy (Krugman 1990).  However, the 
American public was very dissatisfied with the government's performance.     
 
Extant Ideational Collapse   
 
The president's policies to reduce inflation, in order to revive the economy and 
ensure his re-election, instead contributed to reduced consumer borrowing, 
economic stagnation and his subsequent election defeat (Sherman et al 2008, 
623).  The news media, such as the Washington Post, began to openly declare that 
the economy was in a serious recession (Hargrove 1988, 102).  Economists were 
generally of the opinion that there was little likelihood of an economic recovery in 
the medium term.  ‘The great stagflation swamp’ was how Walter Okun (1997) 
termed the situation.  Alan Greenspan, a future chairman of the Federal Reserve, 
observed that as a consequence of the economy's stagnation President Carter 
found himself forced into an emergency programme of restraint, leading to a rapid 
rise in unemployment (Bilhartz and Elliott 2007, 235).  A result of this situation 
was that economists, and other policy entrepreneurs, began to gradually advocate 
a paradigm that they believed was capable of correcting the problems in the 
economy: monetarism.   
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 Various conservative think tanks, such as the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI) - a strong proponent of the free market since the late 1930 - had 
been advocating monetarist ideas, as had economist such as Milton Friedman, 
Karl Brunner of the University of Rochester, Arthur Laffer, Alan Meltzer  of 
Carnegie Mellon University, Robert Lucas and also the economic staff of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  (Blyth 1997, 236-237; Weidenbaum 2011).  
Institutions and economists of this perspective worked hard to ensure that 
economic journalism in the media, in newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal 
served as a conduit for their ideas (Blyth 1997, 237).  The late 1970s also saw a 
group of mostly Republican Congressmen and staffers advocating what became 
known as supply side economics (Hogan 1990a, 137).  With policy entrepreneurs 
generally in agreement as to the inadequacy of the extant paradigm, ideational 
collapse had occurred.    
 
 
New Ideational Consolidation 
 
The Republicans nominated Ronald Reagan as their candidate for President.  
Adopting the role of a political entrepreneur, he embraced the ideology of the 
New Right: a cultural conservatism stressing social and moral issues, and 
advocating supply side economics.  His campaign was to be change orientated.  
This was emphasised in a campaign speech in Chicago advocating the Kemp-Roth 
economic formula (Hogan 1990a, 139).  He had a simple message: low taxes, 
reduced spending on social services, balanced budgets, and fewer government 
regulations.  Advocacy of supply side economics fit particularly well with 
Reagan’s view that the citizens could resolve the country’s problems if there was 
less governmental interference in their lives (Wallison 2003, 59).  Reagan urged a 
bold programme of tax reductions, spending restraints, and regulatory reforms 
that would inject new life into the economy (Hogan 1990b, 228).  Where Barry 
Goldwater had failed in 1964 Reagan was convinced he could triumph in 1980 
(Hirsh 2010, 60). 
Reagan lay the blame for the recession at the door of the president, saying 
that Carter's policies had stifled productivity, while increasing both inflation and 
unemployment (Hirsh 2010).  Reagan succeeded in building an electoral coalition 
around the concept of monetarism and won the 1980 presidential election on the 
back of advocating a marked set of alternative economic ideas which could used 
to supplant extant arrangements (Blyth 1997).  Reagan's election victory, and the 
Republican's regaining control of the Senate for the first time since 1954, were 
seen as providing a mandate for monetarist policies (OECD 1982, 10).  In the 
midst of an economic crisis there was a collapse in confidence in the dominant 
economic orthodoxy.  Various economists, think tanks, and other interest groups, 
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acting as policy entrepreneurs and advocating monetarist economic ideas, 
consolidated around Reagan in the role of a political entrepreneur.  This 
acceptance of monetarism as a viable alternative orthodoxy constituted ideational 
change. 
Several economic, ideological, and social trends contributed to Reagan’s 
appeal.  The 1970s witnessed growing middle class opposition to the taxes 
necessary to sustain programmes such as social security.  This burden became 
greater as the economic depression deepened, leading to a questioning of existing 
policies and their underlying ideas.   
 
 
Third Order Policy Change  
 
Reagan utilised anti-government sentiment to his advantage, emphasising the 
importance of individualism, and a smaller role for the federal government. The 
monetarist proposals of policy entrepreneur Arthur Laffer played a large role in 
Reagan's economic strategy.  To the problem of stagflation he promoted a 
seemingly straightforward remedy: tax cuts, wherein the resulting stimulus would 
boost the federal government's revenues to balance the budget, consequently 
reducing inflationary pressure (Dallek 1984, 64-67).  Reagan’s uncomplicated 
patriotism acted as a balm to the wounded national psyche.  However, the victory 
of New Conservatism was also driven by the challenge to America’s economic 
hegemony by West Germany and Japan.  President Reagan's new economic 
programme, dubbed Reaganomics by the media, was built upon the belief that 
reductions in regulations and taxes would allow the economy to rebound.  Thus, 
new economic policies were drawn along lines that were very different from those 
of preceding governments in their theoretical and political origins (OECD 1982, 
9).   
The first budget the new president sent to Congress proposed a $750 
billion tax cut, built around a 30 percent reduction in federal income tax over 
three years (Jones 1995, 597).  It was bold and original, the largest tax reduction 
in US history (Peterson and Rom 1988, 212).  The administration also reduced 
spending on unemployment benefits programmes, job training programmes, 
public works and trade adjustment assistance-benefits by $11 billion. (Jones 1995, 
597).  These were all moves advocated by David Stockman at the Office of 
Management and Budget as a means of cutting taxes, increasing defence 
expenditure and balancing the budget (Peele 1990, 37).  For Stockman this 
marked a clear break with past policy.8  Middle and working class Americans, 
                                                 
8 Statement of David A Stockman, Director, Office of Management and Budget, before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, 23 January 1981, pp 3-4. 
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who had organised ‘tax revolts’ from Massachusetts to California, applauded this 
policy (Jones 1995, 597). 
The new administration sought to reduce regulation across the economy 
and towards that end it abolished the Council on Wage and Price Stability (OECD 
1982, 24).  Following Reagan's election economic policy instrument settings, the 
instruments of economic policy, and the hierarchy of goals behind economic 
policy, all changed.  This transformation in economic policy endured into the 
administrations of Reagan’s successors.  As such, D’Souza (1997, 85) regards 
Reagan’s programme for the economy as the most ambitious in the half century 
following the Great Depression.     
Wallison (2003, 15-16) argues that Reagan, coming as he did with a fully 
developed philosophy of government, represented a set of ideas that reformulated 
Republican policy to tap into traditional American values – private sector based 
economic growth, and individual opportunity.  In addition to reorientating the 
GOP, he persuaded Americans that there was another way to think about their 
economy and government.  This resulted in the radical shift in economic policy 
that lay at the heart of the "Reagan Revolution" (Weatherford and McDonnell 
2005, 1).  For Wallison (2003, 14) this marked a historic turning point in the US, 
even arguing that the Republicans’ 1994 takeover of Congress was largely based 
on Reagan’s enduring ideas.  Reagan’s economic policies changed the economic 
and political landscape of 1980s America, and an examination of the 1990s shows 
that the thrust of these policies remained essentially intact over a decade later 
(Busch 2005, 41).        
 
Table 1: Empirical Theoretical Fit for the US 1980s 
 US 1980s 
Hypothesis 1 – crisis to initiate debate concerning extant policy Yes 
Hypothesis 2 – ideational change (extant ideational collapse and 
new ideational consolidation) 
Yes 
Hypothesis 3 – third order policy change  Yes 
 
A severe economic crisis led policy entrepreneurs, and outside influences, 
to contest the viability of extant economic policies.  These attacks on extant 
policy led to the collapse of the ideas underlying it.  In this environment, an 
entrepreneurial network of policy entrepreneurs advocated a replacement set of 
ideas: monetarism.  Political entrepreneur Ronald Reagan, willing to promote 
monetarism as an alternative approach to running the economy, managed to 
consolidate the entrepreneurial network advocating this new economic orthodoxy, 
resulting in ideational change.  Following Reagan’s election as president he 
implemented a third order change (paradigm shift) (see Figure 3) in macro-
economic policy (Hall 1993).  Thus, a macro-economic crisis, the initiation of a 
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policy debate, ideational change, and a change of government, all contributed to 
the paradigm shift in economic policy that took place in America after 1981.  
However, the crucial element here was Ronald Reagan.  Acting as the archetypal 
political entrepreneur, after consolidating policy entrepreneurs around a new 
economic ideational structure, he was willing to champion these ideas once in 
power, injecting them into the political environment.  This led directly to the 
radical change in macro-economic policy. 
 
 
Figure 3: The presence of a political entrepreneur in the US 1981 
 
 Political Entrepreneur 
 Political Elite 
 Policy Entrepreneur  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper sought to uncover the inner mechanisms of policy change and 
specifically, how ideas enter the political arena to enact change.  It argues that 
reliance on exogenous shocks to account for policy change is too simplistic and 
fails to explain the absence of change in the wake of a crisis.  The central thesis 
was that the introduction of new ideas into the policy environment, and their 
transformation into policy, was due to the activities of “entrepreneurial networks” 
of policy entrepreneurs, with political entrepreneurs at their head.  The 
entrepreneurial network is, as Schumpeter argued in relation to economic 
entrepreneurs, a vibrant endogenous driver of creative destruction, where new 
policies are formed to replace old and failing ones.  
 The cases examined were Sweden in the mid 1970s and the US at the start 
of the 1980s.  In each case we witnessed economic crisis, criticisms of existing 
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economic policy, resultant policy debates, changes of government and political 
leaders.  In the case of Sweden there was no economic ideational change, whereas 
in the US there was.  While ideational collapse occurred in Sweden, policy 
entrepreneurs, lacking a political entrepreneur, failed to consolidate around a 
viable alternative idea.  Without ideational change, there was only minor policy 
change.  In the US, ideational collapse was followed by ideational change and 
subsequently third order policy change, as an entrepreneurial network of policy 
entrepreneurs, all advocating monetarism, consolidated around a political 
entrepreneur in the form of Ronald Reagan.   The difference between the level of 
economic policy change in the US on the one hand, and Sweden on the other, was 
due to the presence of an entrepreneurial network and a political entrepreneur. 
  In Sweden, the intermediary necessary to bridge the gap between ideas of 
policy entrepreneurs and the political institutions was missing.  While an 
economic crisis initiated debate on existing economic policies, and their 
underlying ideas, this crisis did not result in policy change.  Policy change 
remains firmly dependent upon political entrepreneur led entrepreneurial 
networks consolidating around new economic ideas, which the political 
entrepreneur then introduces to the institutional environment.  The political 
entrepreneur is the primary and endogenous force responsible for policy change.   
However, a limitation of this paper is that the framework set out here is 
tested within relatively stable political/policy systems, into which political 
entrepreneurs can injects new ideas.  An alternative would be to test this 
framework in the context of institutional instability, wherein the political 
entrepreneur might not be an endogenous entity.  Such an examination would test 
the limitations of the framework's hypotheses, allowing for their modification and 
the strengthening of the framework.   
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